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Abstract—Recent research has shown that network coding can
be used in content distribution systems to improve the speed of
downloads and the robustness of the systems. However, such
systems are very vulnerable to attacks by malicious nodes, and
we need to have a signature scheme that allows nodes to check the
validity of a packet without decoding. In this paper, we propose
such a signature scheme for network coding. Our scheme makes
use of the linearity property of the packets in a coded system, and
allows nodes to check the integrity of the packets received easily.
We show that the proposed scheme is secure, and its overhead
is negligible for large ﬁles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding was ﬁrst introduced in [1] as an alternative
to the traditional routing networks, and it has been shown that
random linear coding can be used to improve the throughput
for multicast and even unicast transmissions [2], [3], [4].
More recently, several researchers explored the use of network
coding in content distribution and distributed storage systems
[5], [6]. Traditionally, the solutions for content distribution
are based on a client-server model, where a central server
sends the entire ﬁle to each client that requests it. This
kind of approach becomes inefﬁcient when the ﬁle size is
large or when there are many clients, as it takes up a large
amount of bandwidth and server resources. In recent years,
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks have emerged as an alternative
to traditional content distribution solutions to deliver large
ﬁles. A P2P network has a fully distributed architecture, and
the peers in the network form a cooperative network that
shares the resources, such as storage, CPU, and bandwidth,
of all the computers in the network. This architecture offers a
cost-effective and scalable way to distribute software updates,
videos, and other large ﬁles to a large number of users.
The best example of a P2P cooperative architecture is the
BitTorrent system [7], which splits large ﬁles into small blocks,
and after a node downloads a block from the original server
or from another peer, it becomes a server for that particular
block. Although BitTorrent has become extremely popular
for distribution of large ﬁles over the Internet, it may suffer
from a number of inefﬁciencies which decrease its overall
performance. For example, scheduling is a key problem in
BitTorrent: it is difﬁcult to efﬁciently select which block(s) to
download ﬁrst and from where. If a rare block is only found
on peers with slow connections, this would create a bottleneck
for all the downloaders. Several ad hoc strategies are used in
BitTorrent to ensure that different blocks are equally spread
in the system as the system evolves. References [5], [6]
propose the use of network coding to increase the efﬁciency
of content distribution in a P2P cooperative architecture. The
main idea of this approach is the following (see Fig. 1). The
server breaks the ﬁle to be distributed into small blocks, and
whenever a peer requests a ﬁle, the server sends a random
linear combination of all the blocks. As in BitTorrent, a peer
acts as a server to the blocks it has obtained. However, in a
linear coding scheme, any output from a peer node is also
a random linear combination of all the blocks it has already
received. A peer node can reconstruct the whole ﬁle when
it has received enough degrees of freedom to decode all the
blocks. This scheme is completely distributed, and eliminates
the need for a scheduler, as any block transmitted contains
partial information of all the blocks that the sender possesses.
It has been shown both mathematically [5] and through live
trials [8] that the random linear coding scheme signiﬁcantly
reduces the downloading time and improves the robustness of
the system.
A major concern for any network coding system is the
protection against malicious nodes. Take the above content
distribution system for example. If a node in the P2P network
behaves maliciously, it can create a polluted block with
valid coding coefﬁcients, and then sends it out. Here, coding
coefﬁcients refer to the random linear coefﬁcients used to
generate this block. If there is no mechanism for a peer to
check the integrity of a received block, a receiver of this
polluted block would not be able to decode anything for the
ﬁle at all, even if all the other blocks it has received are valid.
To make things worse, the receiver would mix this polluted
block with other blocks and send them out to other peers, and
the pollution can quickly propagate to the whole network. ThisSource
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Fig. 1. Content distribution with network coding. Assume the ﬁle being
distributed is broken into three blocks, P1, P2, and P3. Any packet being
transmitted is a random linear combination of all the blocks the sender has.
For example, the packet sent from the source to peer A is a combination of
P1, P2, and P3, whereas the packet sent from peer A to D is a combination
of blocks A1 and A2. A peer is able to decode the whole ﬁle when it receives
3 linearly independent blocks.
makes coding based content distribution even more vulnerable
than the traditional P2P networks, such as BitTorrent. Similar
security problems arise in all systems that use network coding,
such as multicast networks. Several attempts were made to
address this problem. Ho et al introduced Byzantine modi-
ﬁcation detection in multicast network with random network
coding [9]. They added a simple polynomial hash value into
each packet, and a receiver node can detect the presence of
a Byzantine attacker with high probability, given that the
attacker is unable to design and supply modiﬁed packets
with complete knowledge of other packets received by other
nodes. Jaggi et al [10] proposed a distributed network coding
scheme for multicast network that is resilient in the presence
of Byzantine adversaries. They view the adversarial nodes as
a second source, and judiciously add redundancy at the real
source to help the receivers distill out the source information
from the received mixtures. References [5], [11] proposed
to use homomorphic hash functions in content distribution
systems to detect polluted packets, and [12] suggested the use
of a Secure Random Checksum (SRC) which requires less
computation than the homomorphic hash function. However,
[12] requires a secure channel to transmit the SRCs to all
the nodes in the network. Charles et al [13] proposed a
signature scheme for network coding that does not require such
a secure channel for transmitting hash values and associated
digital signatures of received and transmitted blocks. This
signature scheme is based on Weil pairing on elliptic curves
and provides authentication of the data in addition to pollution
detection, but the computation complexity of this solution is
quite high. Moreover, the security offered by elliptic curves
that admit Weil pairing is still a topic of debate in the scientiﬁc
community.
In this paper, we propose a new signature scheme that is
not based on elliptic curves, and is designed speciﬁcally for
random linear coded systems. In this scheme, we view all
blocks of the ﬁle as vectors, as in any network coding scheme,
and make use of the fact that all valid vectors transmitted in
the network should belong to the subspace spanned by the
original set of vectors from the ﬁle. We design a signature
that can be used to easily check the membership of a received
vector in the given subspace, and at the same time, it is hard
for a node to generate a vector that is not in that subspace but
passes the signature test. We show that this signature scheme
is secure, and that the overhead for the scheme is negligible
for large ﬁles.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the setup of the problem, and introduce notations
that will be used throughout this paper. We present the new
signature scheme in Section III and prove that it is secure.
Overheads and other aspects of the scheme are discussed in
Section IV, and ﬁnally, the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, we introduce the framework for a random
linear coding based content distribution system. This frame-
work can also be easily modiﬁed to be used for distributed
storage systems. We model the network by a directed graph
Gd = (N,A), where N is the set of nodes, and A is the set
of communication links. A source node s ∈ N wishes to send
a large ﬁle to a set of client nodes, T ⊂ N. In this paper, we
refer to all the clients as peers. The large ﬁle is divided into m
blocks, and any peer receives different blocks from the source
node or from other peers. In this framework, a peer is also
a server to blocks it has downloaded, and always sends out
random linear combinations of all the blocks it has obtained so
far to other peers. When a peer has received enough degrees
of freedom to decode the data, i.e., it has received m linearly
independent blocks, it can re-construct the whole ﬁle.
Speciﬁcally, we view the m blocks of the ﬁle, ¯ v1,...,¯ vm,
as elements in n-dimensional vector space Fn
p, where p is
a prime. The source node augments these vectors to create
vectors v1,...,vm, given by
vi = (0,...,1,...,0, ¯ vi1,..., ¯ vin),
where the ﬁrst m elements are zero except that the ith one is
1, and ¯ vij ∈ Fp is the jth element in ¯ vi. Packets received by
the peers are linear combinations of the augmented vectors,
w =
m X
i=1
βivi,
where βi is the weight of vi in w. We see that the additional
m elements in the front of the augmented vector keeps track
of the β values of the corresponding packet, i.e.,
w = (β1,...,βm, ¯ wi1,..., ¯ win),
where ( ¯ wi1,..., ¯ win) is the payload part of the packet, and
(β1,...,βm) is the code vector that is used to decode the
packets.
As mentioned in the previous section, this kind of network
coding scheme is vulnerable to pollution attacks by maliciousnodes [14], [15], and the pollution can quickly spread to other
parts of the network if the peer just unwittingly mixes this pol-
luted packet into its outgoing packets. Unlike uncoded systems
where the source knows all the blocks being transmitted in the
network, and therefore, can sign each one of them, in a coded
system, each peer produces “new” packets, and standard digital
signature schemes do not apply here. In the next section, we
introduce a novel signature scheme for the coded system.
III. SIGNATURE SCHEME FOR NETWORK CODING
We note that the vectors v1,...,vm span a subspace V of
Fm+n
p , and a received vector w is a valid linear combination of
vectors v1,...,vm if and only if it belongs to the subspace V .
This is the key observation for our signature scheme. In the
scheme described below, we present a system that is based
upon standard modulo arithmetic (in particular the hardness
of the Discrete Logarithm problem) and upon an invariant
signature σ(V ) for the linear span V . Each node veriﬁes the
integrity of a received vector w by checking the membership
of w in V based on the signature σ(V ).
Our signature scheme is deﬁned by the following ingredi-
ents, which are independent of the ﬁle(s) to be distributed:
• q: a large prime number such that p is a divisor of q−1.
Note that standard techniques, such as that used in Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA), apply to ﬁnd such q.
• g: a generator of the group G of order p in Fq. Since the
order of the multiplicative group F∗
q is q − 1, which is a
multiple of p, we can always ﬁnd a subgroup, G, with
order p in F∗
q.
• Private key: Kpr = {αi}i=1,...,m+n, a random set of
elements in F∗
p. Kpr is only known to the source.
• Public key: Kpu = {hi = gαi}i=1,...,m+n. Kpu is
signed by some standard signature scheme, e.g., DSA,
and published by the source.
To distribute a ﬁle in a secure manner, the signature scheme
works as follows.
1) Using the vectors v1,...,vm from the ﬁle, the source
ﬁnds a vector u = (u1,...,um+n) ∈ Fm+n
p orthogonal
to all vectors in V . Speciﬁcally, the source ﬁnds a non-
zero solution, u, to the equations
vi   u = 0, i = 1,...,m.
2) The source computes vector x = (u1/α1,u2/α2,...,
um+n/αm+n).
3) The source signs x with some standard signature scheme
and publishes x. We refer to the vector x as the
signature, σ(V ), of the ﬁle being distributed.
4) The client node veriﬁes that x is signed by the source.
5) When a node receives a vector w and wants to verify
that w is in V , it computes
d =
m+n Y
i=1
h
xiwi
i ,
and veriﬁes that d = 1.
To see that d is equal to 1 for any valid w, we have
d =
m+n Y
i=1
h
xiwi
i
=
m+n Y
i=1
(gαi)uiwi/αi
=
m+n Y
i=1
guiwi
= g
Pm+n
i=1 (uiwi)
= 1,
where the last equality comes from the fact that u is orthogonal
to all vectors in V .
Next, we show that the system described above is secure. In
essence, the theorem below shows that given a set of vectors
that satisfy the signature veriﬁcation criterion, it is provably
as hard as the Discrete Logarithm problem to ﬁnd new vectors
that also satisfy the veriﬁcation criterion other than those that
are in the linear span of the vectors already known.
Deﬁnition 1. Let p be a prime number and G be a multi-
plicative cyclic group of order p. Let k and n be two integers
such that k < n, and Γ = {h1,...,hn} be a set of generators
of G. Given a linear subspace, V , of rank k in Fn
p such that
for every v ∈ V , the equality Γv ,
Qn
i=1 h
vi
i = 1 holds, we
deﬁne the (p,k,n)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem as the problem of
ﬁnding a vector w ∈ Fn
p with Γw = 1 but w / ∈ V .
By this deﬁnition, the problem of ﬁnding an invalid vector
that satisﬁes our signature veriﬁcation criterion is a (p,m,m+
n)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem. Note that in general, the (p,n −
1,n)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem has no solution. This is because
if V has rank n − 1 and a w′ exists such that Γw
′
= 1
and w′ / ∈ V , then w′ + V spans the whole space, and any
vector w ∈ Fn
p would satisfy Γw = 1. This is clearly not true,
therefore, no such w′ exists.
Theorem 1. For any k < n − 1, the (p,k,n)-Difﬁe-Hellman
problem is as hard as the Discrete Logarithm problem.
Proof: Assume that we have an efﬁcient algorithm to
solve the (p,k,n)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem, and we wish to
compute the discrete algorithm logg(z) for some z = gx,
where g is a generator of a cyclic group G with order p.
We can choose two random vectors r = (r1,...,rn) and
s = (s1,...,sn) in Fn
p, and construct Γ = {h1,...,hn}, where
hi = zrigsi for i = 1,...,n. We then ﬁnd k linearly indepen-
dent (and otherwise random) solution vectors v1,...,vk to the
equations
v   r = 0 and v   s = 0.
Note that there exist n−2 linearly independent solutions to the
above equations. Let V be the linear span of {v1,...,vk}, it is
clear that any vector v ∈ V satisﬁes Γv = 1. Now, if we have
an algorithm for the (p,k,n)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem, we can
ﬁnd a vector w / ∈ V such that Γw = 1. This vector would
satisfy w   (xr + s) = 0. Since r is statistically independent
from (xr+s), with probability greater than 1−1/p, we havew   r  = 0. In this case, we can compute
logg(z) = x =
w   s
w   r
.
This means the ability to solve the (p,k,n)-Difﬁe-Hellman
problem implies the ability to solve the Discrete Logarithm
problem.
This proof is an adaptation of a proof that appeared in an
earlier publication by Boneh et. al [16].
IV. DISCUSSION
Our signature scheme nicely makes use of the linearity
property of random linear network coding, and enables the
peers to check the integrity of packets without the requirement
for a secure channel, as in the case of hash function or SRC
schemes [5], [11], [12]. Also, the computation involved in the
signature generation and veriﬁcation processes is very simple.
Next, we examine the overhead incurred by this signature
scheme. Let the ﬁle size be M and let the ﬁle be divided into
m blocks, each one of which is a vector in Fn
p. The size of
each block is B = nlog(p) and we have M = mnlog(p).
The size of each augmented vector (with coding vectors in
the front) is Ba = (m + n)log(p), and thus, the overhead of
the coding vector is m/n times the ﬁle size. Note that this
is the overhead pertaining to the linear coding scheme, not
to our signature scheme, and any practical network coding
system would make m ≪ n. The initial setup of our signature
scheme involves the publishing of the public key, Kpu, which
has size (m+n)log(q). In typical cryptographic applications,
the size of p is 20 bytes (160 bits), and the size of q is 128
bytes (1024 bits), thus, the size of Kpu is approximately equal
to 6(m + n)/mn times the ﬁle size.
For distribution of each ﬁle, the incremental overhead of
our scheme consists of two parts: the public data, Kpu, and
the signature vector, x.
For the public key, Kpu, we note that it cannot be fully
reused for multiple ﬁles, as it is possible for a malicious node
to generate a invalid vector that satisﬁes the check d = 1
using information obtained from previously downloaded ﬁles.
Speciﬁcally, let x1 be the signature of File 1, and w1 be a
valid received vector for File 1, we have
d =
m+n Y
i=1
h
x1iw1i
i = 1.
If the source then distribute File 2 using the same public
key, Kpu, and a different signature, x2, a malicious node
can construct a vector w2, where w2i = x1iw1i/x2i, which
satisﬁes the signature check
d =
m+n Y
i=1
h
x2iw2i
i =
m+n Y
i=1
h
x1iw1i
i = 1.
However, w2 is not a valid linear combination of the vectors
of File 2. To prevent this from happening, we can publish a
public key for each ﬁle, and as mentioned above, the overhead
is about 6(m + n)/mn times the ﬁle size, which is small as
long as 6 ≪ m ≪ n. Note that if we republish Kpu for every
new ﬁle, we can reuse the signature vector x. Let u2 be a
vector that is orthogonal to all vectors in File 2, the source
can compute a new private key, Kpr = {α1,...,αm+n}, given
by
αi = u2i/xi, i = 1,...,m + n.
The source then publishes the new public key, Kpu = {hi =
gαi}i=1,...,m+n. In this way, we do not need to publish new
x vectors for the subsequent ﬁles.
Alternatively, for every new ﬁle, we can randomly pick an
integer i between 1 and m + n, select a new random value
for αi in the private key, and publish the new hi = gαi. The
overhead for this method is (m + n) times smaller than that
described in the previous paragraph, i.e., this overhead is only
6/mn times the ﬁle size. As an example, if we have a ﬁle
of size 10MB, divided into m = 100 blocks, the value of n
would be in the order of thousands, and thus, this overhead is
less than 0.01% of the ﬁle size. This method should provide
good security except in the case where we expect the vector w
to have low variability, for example, has many zeros. Security
can be increased by changing more elements in the private key
for each new ﬁle.
However, if we only change one element in the public
key, for each new ﬁle distributed, we also have to publish
a new signature x, which is computed from a vector u that
is orthogonal to the subspace V spanned by the ﬁle. Since
the V has dimension m, it is sufﬁcient to only replace m
elements in u to generate a vector orthogonal to the new ﬁle.
Since the ﬁrst m elements in the vectors v1,...,vm are always
linearly independent (they are the code vectors), it sufﬁces to
just modify the entries u1 to um. Assume that the ith element
in the private key is the only one that has been changed for
the distribution of the new ﬁle, and that i is between 1 and m,
then we only need to publish x1 to xm for the new signature
vector. This part of the overhead has size mlog(p), and the
ratio between this overhead and the original ﬁle size N is 1/n.
Again, take a 10MB ﬁle for example, this overhead is less than
0.1% of the ﬁle size.
Therefore, after the initial setup, each additional ﬁle dis-
tributed only incurs a negligible amount of overhead using
our signature scheme.
Finally, we would like to point out that, under our assump-
tions that there is no secure side channel from the source to
all the peers and that the public key is available to all the
peers, our signature scheme has to be used on the original
ﬁle vectors not on hash functions. This is because to maintain
the security of the system, we need to use a one-way hash
function that is homomorphic, however, we are not aware
of any such hash function. Although [5] and [11] suggested
usage of homomorphic hash functions for network coding,
[5] assumed that the intermediate nodes do not know the
parameters used for generating the hash function, and [11]
assumed that a secure channel is available to transmit the hash
values of all the blocks from the source node to the peers.
Under our more relaxed assumptions, these hash functions
would not work.V. CONCLUSIONS
Security problem is a main obstacle in the implementation
of content distribution networks using random linear network
coding. To tackle this problem, instead of trying to ﬁt an
existing signature scheme to network coding based systems,
in this paper, we proposed a new signature scheme that is
made speciﬁcally for such systems. We introduced a signature
vector for each ﬁle distributed, and the signature can be used
to easily check the integrity of all the packets received for this
ﬁle. We have shown that the proposed scheme is as hard as the
Discrete Logarithm problem, and the overhead of this scheme
is negligible for a large ﬁle.
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